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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we study the international trans-
mission of European and U.S. monetary policy shocks in the case where all
export prices are set in U.S. dollars. Second, we study how the emergence
of the euro as an international currency may change the international trans-
mission of monetary shocks.
One issue that has received considerable attention in open economy
macroeconomics is the international transmission of monetary policy. The
recent "new open economy macroeconomics" (NOEM) literature1 has shown
that the transmission of monetary shocks across countries is predicated by
the pass-through of exchange rate changes to import prices. The degree of
exchange rate pass-through and the elasticity of substitution between domes-
tic and foreign goods determine the strength of the expenditure switching
e¤ect. The smaller the e¤ect of exchange rate changes on relative prices,
the smaller the expenditure switching e¤ect.2
Most of the contributions that address the international transmission of
monetary shocks, including the seminal Redux model of Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(1995), assume that export prices are set in the producer’s currency. The
literature often refers to this case as "producer currency pricing" (PCP).
In this case, there is a complete pass-through of exchange rate changes to
import prices. On the other hand, among others Betts and Devereux (1996,
2000, 2001) have assumed that export prices can be set in the consumers’
currency. This case is often referred as "local currency pricing" (LCP). In
this case, exchange rate pass-through to import prices is zero. In Betts
and Devereux (2000), the authors incorporate LCP into the Obstfeld-Rogo¤
(1995) model. They show that the degree of short-run exchange rate pass-
through is crucial for the international transmission of monetary shocks.
One limitation of the recent literature is that it has focused primarily
on the case where exchange rate pass-through is symmetric, i.e. the same
for both countries. A third possibility, that all export prices are set in one
currency, has received notable less attention despite it being "probably the
most relevant from an empirical viewpoint" (Corsetti –Pesenti 2005, 22).
We refer to this case as "dollar pricing" (DP). In the dollar pricing case,
exchange rate pass-through is asymmetric. If all …rms set export prices
in U.S. dollars, exchange rate pass-through is zero in the U.S. and one in
Europe. How are monetary shocks transmitted under DP? One purpose of
this paper to analyze the international transmission of monetary shocks in
1Lane (2001) provides an extensive survey of the NOEM literature. Lane and Ganelli
(2003) focus on the pass-though debate and the role of the current account and net foreign
assets in adjustment dynamics.
2Engel (2002), Obstfeld (2002) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) discuss how low pass-
through of exchange rate changes to consumer prices a¤ect the expenditure switching
e¤ect.
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the DP case.
The single European currency was –and is –a fundamental economic
change. As mentioned by Devereux et al. (2003, 223), the academic litera-
ture has abundantly discussed the question of whether Europe is an optimal
currency area. No doubt a major e¤ect of the euro was to permanently
…x exchange rates in Europe. The single European currency can also be a
di¤erent change: the euro may become an international currency.3
In this paper, we concentrate on one question that has attracted surpris-
ingly little attention in the literature. If the euro becomes an international
currency, how will this a¤ect the international transmission of European
(the euro zone’s, to be precise) and U.S. monetary policies? The emergence
of the euro is likely to alter international price setting. For example, Dev-
ereux et al. (2003, 223) emphasize, that: "While at present world trade and
…nancial ‡ows are carried out predominantly in U.S. dollars, the relative
importance of the dollar may diminish as the euro becomes more widely ac-
ceptable in international transactions." The emergence of the euro can alter
the pricing behavior of both European and U.S. …rms. Our conjecture is
that the emergence of the euro leads to a situation where more European
exports are invoiced in euros, but it does not alter the pricing behavior of
U.S. …rms. Therefore, we study how the transition from DP to PCP a¤ects
the international transmission of European and U.S. monetary policies.
As mentioned, this paper has two main purposes. The …rst is to study
the international transmission of European and U.S. monetary shocks in the
DP case. The second is to study how the emergence of the euro a¤ects the
international transmission of monetary shocks. To address these research
questions, this paper develops a model based on Betts and Devereux (2000).
As indicated above, Betts and Devereux build a version of the Obstfeld-
Rogo¤ (1995) model in which a fraction of …rms set export prices in the
consumers’currency. We make two modi…cations to their model. The …rst
is the use of staggered price setting.4 The second is that only a fraction of
foreign/European …rms set prices separately for two markets.
There is a substantial literature on the international e¤ects of monetary
shocks, including innovative papers by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and Betts
and Devereux (2000). In this context, other relevant papers include Suther-
land (1996) that introduces staggered price setting into the Obstfeld-Rogo¤
model. The model that is developed in this paper is in one case, where all
export prices are set in the producer’s currency, rather identical to the model
by Sutherland. The models by Senay (1998) and Betts and Devereux (2001)
are also relevant. Both papers develop a model that allows for staggered
price setting and market segmentation. The authors additionally assume
3See e.g. Portes and Rey (1998).
4"The use of a staggered price setting structure allows for richer dynamic e¤ects of
monetary policy than those found in the models with one-period advanced price-setting
that are common in the literature" Gali and Monacelli (2005, 707).
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that exchange rate pass-though is symmetric.
Analyses of the international transmission of monetary shocks in the
case where exchange rate pass-through is asymmetric include Corsetti and
Pesenti (2005) and Schmidt (2005). The analysis of Corsetti and Pesenti
(2005) is elegant but somewhat restricted due to the fact that the elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods is set to unity. Schmidt
(2005) develops a model that uses staggered price setting and allows for
asymmetric exchange rate pass-through.5 A limitation of these papers is
that only the e¤ects of domestic (U.S. –in this case) monetary shocks are
analyzed. The assumption of dollar pricing is also used in the paper by
Devereux et al. (2003). Interestingly, they explore the relationship between
the euro and the international transmission of monetary shocks. However,
the focus of their paper is di¤erent from ours, they focus on the question
of how the euro may change the sensitivity of consumer prices in Europe
to exchange rate changes. In addition, they conjecture that the in‡uence of
the euro is to change the pricing behavior of U.S. …rms.
The analysis of this paper predicts that, in the DP case, the impact of
U.S. monetary shocks on European output and consumption is positive. On
the other hand, European monetary shocks have negative implications for
the U.S. economy. The di¤erences in the international transmission of mon-
etary shocks stem from asymmetric exchange rate pass-through. Another
…nding is that if the role of the euro in international trade increases, the
stimulate e¤ects of monetary shocks on the region’s own output are rein-
forced. A sting in the tail is that the increase in the e¤ectiveness of monetary
shocks comes at the expense of the other region’s output. In particular, the
model predicts that the emergence of the euro can reverse the positive e¤ect
of U.S. monetary shocks on European output to negative.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how the emergence
of the euro as an international currency may change the currency denom-
ination of international trade. Section 3 introduces the model and derives
the equilibrium conditions. Section 4 uses the model to study the interna-
tional transmission of monetary shocks under DP. Section 5 analyzes how
the emergence of the euro a¤ects the international transmission of monetary
shocks. Section 6 presents conclusions.
5The model developed in this paper di¤ers from the model by Schmidt (2005) in many
ways. In this paper, in contrast to Schmidt (2005), there is no home bias in consumption,
we do not allow for di¤erent elasticities of substitution across and within countries, we
abstract capital formation and there is only one international traded asset.
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2 The Emergence of the Euro as an International
Currency
2.1 The Role of the Euro in International Trade
A good question in international macroeconomics is "if output prices are pre-
set in nominal terms, in what currency are they denominated?" (Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ 2000, 118). But let us put aside for a moment the question of
what determines the choice of currency of price setting (invoicing currency).
Let us brie‡y look at the evidence. A report by ECU institute (1995, 73)
concludes that: "The national currency remains the principal currency used
for the denomination of national exports," as cited by Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(2000). However, the U.S. is an exception, with 92 % of exports and 80
% of imports invoiced in dollars. Thus "there is asymmetry such that U.S.
exports to Europe are heavily invoiced in dollars, but European exports to
the U.S. are also invoiced in dollars" (Devereux et al. 2003, 224). Hence,
it is essential to study the international transmission of monetary shocks in
the case where all export prices are set in dollars.
The euro has started to change the invoicing of international trade. In
the review of the international role of the euro, the ECB (2005, 29) notes
that: "The use of the euro as a currency of the settlement or invoicing of
international trade transactions... ...has shown a notable increase in recent
years." The ECB’s review also points out: "Concerning exports, in 2004 the
share of the euro in extra-euro area exports increased for both goods and
services." For example, in 2001 49 % of German exports to the extra-euro
area were invoiced in euros (or in Deutsche Marks), by 2004 the share had
increased to 61.1 %.
2.2 The Euro and the Choice of Invoicing Currency
Returning to the question of what determines the choice of currency in which
international trade is be to invoiced. The question is complex and we do not
try to give a comprehensive answer to this question. Instead, we highlight
the key results of the literature that are relevant to the theme of this paper.
Swoboda (1968, 1969) emphasized the role of transaction costs in trading
in di¤erent currencies to be an important factor in the choice of invoicing
currency. He argued that the dollar in much used in international trade as
a vehicle currency because it is highly liquid currency with low transaction
costs. The euro is highly liquid currency with low transaction costs and thus
the use of the euro in international trade is likely to increase.
The choice of invoicing currency a¤ects the risks arising from exchange
rate ‡uctuations. Partial equilibrium models such as Giovannini (1988),
Donnenfeld and Zilcha (1991) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) show
that there is trade-o¤ between demand and price uncertainty that the ex-
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porter faces. If PCP is chosen, there is uncertainty about demand because
prices abroad move one-to-one with the exchange rate. Exchange rate ‡uctu-
ations change the quantity demanded. If LCP is chosen, there is no demand
uncertainty, but there is uncertainty about the price when converted back to
the exporter’s currency. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) show that, for
a pro…t-maximizing …rm, high product di¤erentiation (a low price elasticity
of demand) makes PCP more attractive. The emergence of the euro as an
international currency can imply that European …rms are able to avoid the
exchange rate risk.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) show that the market share of the
exporting country is also crucial for the pricing decision. The higher the
market share of an exporting country, the more likely it chooses PCP. If
the country is large enough and …rms coordinate their choice of invoicing
currency, they all prefer PCP. The relative price of the …rm’s output is less
sensitive to the exchange rate, reducing demand uncertainty, the more of its
competitors choose the same invoicing currency.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005) also study the e¤ect of a monetary
union on the choice of invoicing currency in international trade, providing
important insights about the implications of the European Monetary Union
(EMU). One of the main results is that: "If a set of countries form a monetary
union they are more likely to invoice in their own currency" (Bacchetta
and van Wincoop 2005, 306). EMU created a large region, with a larger
market share than that of any of single European country. Therefore, EMU
is likely to lead more invoicing in euros than in the currencies that were
replaced by the euro. In their model, it is possible that before EMU all
European exporters invoice in foreign currency while after EMU there is
a Nash equilibrium where all exporters invoice in euros. Certainly, the
emergence of the euro as an international currency is a long-run issue.
The increase in the use of the euro in international trade is likely to
continue. For the reasons discussed above, the share of the euro in the
invoicing of European exports is likely to increase. The …ndings of Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2005) suggest that, after the creation of a monetary union,
also imports by the monetary union are more likely to be invoiced in the
union’s currency. However, we conjecture that U.S. …rms will not change
-much -their export pricing; the use of the euro in the exports of third
countries likely is to increase substantially more. Besides, it is highly unlike
that the emergence of the euro as an international currency would be so
powerful that both European and U.S. …rms start to invoice their exports
in euros. It would turn the world upside down.
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3 The Model
In this section, we develop a fairly standard NOEM model. As mentioned,
the model is based on Betts and Devereux (2000). We extend the Betts-
Devereux model by allowing a staggered price setting framework. In addi-
tion, we assume that only a fraction of European …rms price-discriminate
across regions.
3.1 Region Size and Market Structure
The world economy is made up of two regions, the U.S. and Europe (the euro
zone). The world economy consists of the governments and a continuum of
households and …rms. The world size normalized to one, and consider that
households and …rms over the [0,n) interval are in the U.S., while households
and …rms over the [n,1] interval are in Europe. Within each region, every
household owns an equal share of all domestic …rms.
As mentioned, the report by ECU Institute (1995) suggests that both
U.S. exports to Europe and European exports to the U.S. are mainly in-
voiced in dollars. We assume that all U.S. …rms set a uni…ed price across
the two regions. U.S. …rms set prices in U.S. dollars and let prices in Europe
move one-to-one with the exchange rate. Our conjecture is that more Eu-
ropean …rms will set export prices in euros. Hence, we allow for two types
of European …rms. First, a fraction s of European …rms price-discriminate
across regions. These …rms set prices separately for the U.S. and European
market and set prices in the local currency of the customer. Hence, we dub
these …rms as "European LCP …rms". Second, the remaining 1¡ s of Euro-
pean …rms, like U.S. …rms, set a uni…ed price across the two regions. These
…rms set prices in euros and let prices in the U.S. move one-to-one with
the exchange rate. Because these …rms set export prices in the producer’s
currency, we dub these …rms as "European PCP …rms".
Two special cases are worth observing. When s = 0, all export prices
are set in dollars. When s = 1, export prices are set in the producer’s
currency. As was mentioned, we suppose that the emergence of the euro
as an international currency implies that more European …rms set export
prices in euros. For simplicity, we assume that this implies a transition from
DP to PCP.
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3.2 Households
3.2.1 Preferences
Preferences are identical across regions. The lifetime utility of a representa-
tive U.S. household, indexed by z, is given by
Ut (z) =
1X
s=t
¯s¡t
"
log Cs +
Â
1 ¡ "
µ
Ms
Ps
¶1¡"
¡ `s (z)
2
2
#
: (1)
Here ¯ is the discount rate, C is a consumption index (de…ned below), " and
Â are positive parameters, M is the nominal balances and P is the consumer
price index (de…ned below). The variable ` is the amount of labour supplied
by a representative U.S. households. The consumption index is
C =
24 1Z
0
c(z)
µ¡1
µ dz
35
µ
µ¡1
;
where c (z) is consumption of good z and µ > 1 measures the elasticity
of substitution between di¤erentiated goods (and the price elasticity of de-
mand). Let pt represent dollar prices, while prices denoted by qt represent
euro prices. The consumer price index is
Pt =
24 nZ
0
pt (z)
1¡µ dz +
Z n+(1¡n)s
n
pt (z
¤)1¡µ dz +
Z 1
n+(1¡n)s
(Etqt (z
¤))1¡µ dz
35 11¡µ :
Here p (z) is the dollar price of U.S. good z, p (z¤), is the dollar price of
European good z¤ and q (z¤) is the euro price of a European good. The
variable E is the exchange rate, the dollar price of the euro. Similarly, the
European price index is
P ¤t =
24 nZ
0
(pt (z) =Et)
1¡µ dz +
Z 1
n
qt (z
¤)1¡µ dz
35 11¡µ :
3.2.2 Budget Constraints and First-Order Conditions
Households receive a wage income, dividends from domestic …rms, nominal
transfers from the government and purchase consumption goods. House-
holds can hold two assets, domestic money and international assets. We
assume that the only internationally traded asset is a riskless nominal bond,
denominated in the dollar. A representative U.S. household maximizes the
utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint
Mt + ±tDt = Dt¡1 + Mt¡1 + wt`t ¡ PtCt + ¼t + Pt¿ t: (2)
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Here ±t is the nominal price of the bond (±t = (1 + it)
¡1, where it is the
nominal U.S. interest rate) that pays one dollar in period t+1 and Dt is the
bond holdings at the beginning of period t, w is the nominal wage and ¼ de-
notes the nominal pro…ts (dividends) of U.S. …rms. The government repays
all seignorage revenues to households in the form of lump sum transfers.
These transfer are denoted by ¿ .
In Europe, the budget constraint is
M¤t + ±
¤
t
D¤t
Et
=
D¤t¡1
Et
+ M¤t¡1 + w
¤
t `
¤
t ¡ P ¤t C¤t + ¼¤t + P ¤t ¿¤t ; (3)
This implies that the realized return in euros on the international bond at the
beginning of period t is (1 + it)Et¡1=Et. The global asset-market-clearing
condition requires nDt + (1 ¡ n)D¤t = 0.
The …rst-order conditions for the maximization problems for U.S. and
European households are6
±tPt+1Ct+1 = ¯PtCt; (4)
±¤tP
¤
t+1C
¤
t+1Et+1 = ¯P
¤
t C
¤
t Et; (5)
`t =
wt
CtPt
; (6)
`¤t =
w¤t
C¤t P ¤t
; (7)
Mt
Pt
=
µ
ÂCt
1 ¡ ±t
¶1
"
; (8)
M¤t
P ¤t
=
Ã
ÂC¤t
1 ¡ ±¤t Et+1Et
!1
"
: (9)
Equations (4) and (5) are the Euler equations for the intertemporal al-
location of consumption. Equations (6) and (7) govern the optimal labour
supply, it depends on the real wage and the level of real consumption. Equa-
tions (8) and (9) show that the demand for money is a positive function of
consumption and a negative function of the interest rate.
3.3 Monetary Policy
We abstract from government spending so the transfers to households are
given by
¿ t =
Mt ¡ Mt¡1
Pt
: (10)
6The usual transversality condition applies. Since the model hitherto is identical to
that of Betts and Devereux (2000), the …rst order conditions are the same as in their
model.
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The money supply is assumed to follow a …rst-order autoregressive process
M^t = ½M^t¡1 + ²M;t;
where percentage changes from the baseline are denoted by hats and ²M;t
is an unpredictable shift in the money supply. As usual, we consider the
Dornbusch (1976) experiment of an unanticipated permanent rise in the
money supply, thus we assume ½ = 1. In Europe, the transfers to households
and monetary policy are completely analogous to those of the U.S.
3.4 The Terms of Trade and the Real Exchange Rate
For future reference, we de…ne the terms of trade and the real exchange rate.
The U.S. export price index is given by
¡t (z) =
·Z n
0
pt (z)
1¡µ dz
¸ 1
1¡µ
:
In the same way, the European export price index (the U.S. import price
index) is given by
¡¤t (z
¤) =
264n+(1¡n)sZ
n
(pt (z
¤) =Et)1¡µ dz +
1Z
n+(1¡n)s
qt (z
¤)1¡µ dz
375
1
1¡µ
:
Thus the U.S. terms of trade, the relative price of U.S. exports in terms of
U.S. imports, can be written as
TOTt =
¡t (z)
Et¡¤T (z¤)
:
The real exchange rate is de…ned as
Real exchange rate =
EtP ¤t
Pt
:
3.5 Firms
3.5.1 Technology and Pro…ts
Each …rm produces a di¤erentiated good. The production function is linear
in labour input
yt (z) = `t (z) ;
where y (z) is the total output of …rm z and ` (z) is labour input used by
…rm z. The total output of a European LCP …rm is divided between output
sold in the U.S. denoted by v¤ (z¤), and output sold in Europe, denoted by
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x¤ (z¤). The pro…ts of a European LCP …rm, a European PCP …rm and a
U.S. …rm, respectively, are given by
¼LCPt (z
¤) = (pt (z¤) v¤t (z
¤)) =Et + qt (z¤)x¤t (z
¤) ¡ w¤t `¤t (z¤) ;
¼PCPt (z
¤) = qt (z¤) y¤t (z
¤) ¡ w¤t `¤t (z¤) ;
¼t (z) = pt (z) yt (z) ¡ wt`t (z) :
The demand functions are
vt (z
¤) =
µ
pt (z¤)
Pt
¶¡µ
nCt; (11)
xt (z
¤) =
µ
qt (z¤)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
(1 ¡ n)C¤t ; (12)
y¤t (z
¤) =
µ
Etqt (z¤)
Pt
¶¡µ
nCt +
µ
qt (z¤)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
(1 ¡ n)C¤t ; (13)
yt (z) =
µ
pt (z)
Pt
¶¡µ
nCt +
µ
pt (z)
EtP ¤t
¶¡µ
(1 ¡ n)C¤t : (14)
Equations (11) and (12) represent the demand functions for a European LCP
…rm in the U.S. and Europe, respectively. Equations (13) and (14) represent
the demand function for a European PCP …rm and a U.S. …rm, respectively.
Making use of the demand functions and the fact that the nominal marginal
cost equals the nominal wage, the pro…ts of the …rms can be written as
¼LCPt (z
¤) =
"µ
qt (z¤)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
(1 ¡ n)C¤t
#
(qt (z
¤) ¡ w¤t )
+
"µ
pt (z¤)
Pt
¶¡µ
nCt
# µ
pt (z¤)
Et
¡ w¤t
¶
; (15)
¼P CPt (z
¤) =
"µ
qt (z
¤)
P ¤t
¶¡µ
(1 ¡ n)C¤t
#
(qt (z
¤) ¡ w¤t )+
"µ
Etqt (z
¤)
Pt
¶¡µ
nCt
#
(qt (z
¤) ¡ w¤t ) ;
¼t (z) =
"µ
pt (z)
Pt
¶¡µ
nCt
#
(pt (z) ¡ wt) +
"µ
pt (z)
EtP ¤t
¶¡µ
nCt
#
(pt (z) ¡ wt) :
3.5.2 International Price Setting
In the absence of nominal rigidities, a European LCP …rm maximizes (15)
with respect to qt (z¤) and pt (z¤). The pricing rule is given by
pt (z
¤) = Etqt (z¤) =
µ
µ ¡ 1w
¤
t :
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The optimal price is just a constant markup over marginal costs. Since the
price elasticity of demand is the same in both markets, the law of one price
(LOOP) holds.
We now turn to staggered price adjustment. We consider a discrete-
time version of Calvo (1983). Each period t, there is a probability ° that a
…rm has no opportunity to change its price. Firms set prices to maximize
expected discounted pro…ts taking into account the expected time until they
will be able to change their prices. For example, the objective of a European
LCP …rm is
max
pt(z¤);qt(z¤)
Vt (z
¤) =
1X
s=t
°s¡t³¤t;s¼
LCP
t (z
¤) ; (16)
where ³¤s;t = ¦tj=s
³
1 + i¤j
´¡1
is the discount factor between time t and time
s. The …rst-order conditions are
pt (z
¤) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;sCs
³
1
Ps
´¡µ
w¤sP1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;sCs
³
1
Ps
´¡µ
=Et
:
qt (z
¤) =
µ
µ
µ ¡ 1
¶ P1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;sC¤s
³
1
P¤s
´¡µ
w¤sP1
s=t °
s¡t³¤t;sC¤s
³
1
P¤s
´¡µ :
These equations are a bit uninformative. We can use these equations to
obtain di¤erence equations to describe the price setting strategy:
p^t (z
¤) = ¯°p^t+1 (z¤) + (1 ¡ ¯°)
³
w^¤t + E^t
´
;
q^t (z
¤) = ¯°q^¤t+1 (z) + (1 ¡ ¯°) w^¤t : (17)
The price setting strategy is forward-looking. A LCP …rm sets price, for
the good sold in Europe, as a markup over a weighted average of current
and expected nominal marginal costs. The price of the same good in the
U.S. depends also on the exchange rate. The price setting problem facing
a European PCP …rm is almost identical to that of a LCP …rm, albeit it
sets only one price. However, the price setting strategy of a PCP …rm is
identical to (17). By the same token, the price setting strategy of a U.S.
…rm is to set price that a markup over a weighted average of current and
expected nominal marginal costs
p^t (z) = ¯°p^t+1 (z) + (1 ¡ ¯°) w^t:
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3.6 A Symmetric Steady State and Equilibrium
All …rms within a region are symmetric, which implies that every …rm which
alter its price in period t sets the same price and produces the same output.
The law of large number implies that a fraction ° of goods prices remain
unchanged, while the remaining 1 ¡ ° of …rms get to set new prices. Thus
the price indexes can be written as
Pt =
"
n (1 ¡ °)P1s=0 °spt¡s (z)1¡µ + [(n + (1 ¡ n) s) ¡ n] (1 ¡ °)P1s=0 °spt¡s (z¤)1¡µ +
[1 ¡ (n + (1 ¡ n) s)] (1 ¡ °)P1s=0 °s¡t (Et¡sqt¡s (z¤))1¡µ
# 1
1¡µ
;
P ¤t =
"
n (1 ¡ °)
1X
s=0
°s (pt¡s (z) =Et¡s)1¡µ + (1 ¡ n) (1 ¡ °)
1X
s=0
°sq¤t¡s (z
¤)1¡µ
# 1
1¡µ
:
In a steady state, all exogenous variables are constant. Because consump-
tion is constant, the steady-state world interest rate ¹{ (steady state values
are marked by overbars) is tied down by the consumption Euler equations
(4) and (5): ¯ = ¹± = (1 +¹{)¡1.
The consolidated budget constraints of the U.S. and European economies,
respectively, are given by
±tDt = Dt¡1 + pt (z) yt (z) ¡ PtCt;
¡ n
1 ¡ n±
¤
t
Dt
Et
= ¡ n
1 ¡ n
Dt¡1
Et
+ (1 ¡ s) qt (z¤) y¤t (z¤)
+s
µ
p¤t (z
¤)x¤t (z
¤) +
pt (z¤) v¤t (z¤)
Et
¶
¡ P ¤t C¤t :
As standard in the literature, we log-linearize the model around the ini-
tial symmetric steady state with ¹D0 = ¹D¤0 = 0. Then the model is analyzed
in terms of percentage deviations around this steady state. Equilibrium is
sequences of variables that (i) clear the labour, goods and money markets
in each region in each period, (ii) satisfy the optimality conditions for con-
sumption evolution, (iii) satisfy the optimal pricing rules and (iv) satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraints.
4 The International Transmission of Monetary Shocks
under Dollar Pricing
4.1 Calibration
The calibration of the model follows Sutherland (1996), with one exception.
The reasoning behind the calibration is as follows. We interpret periods
as quarters. Therefore, ¯ is set to 1=1:01, which implies about 4 percent
annual real interest rate.7 Parameter " is set to 9, which implicates that the
7Sutherland sets ¯ = 1=1:05. Lowering ¯ causes minor quantative changes.
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consumption elasticity of money demand is 1=9 and the interest elasticity of
money demand is ¡1=9. The elasticity of substitution between goods µ is
set to 6, which means a 20 percent markup in the steady state. Parameter
° is set equal to 0.5, this implies an average delay between price adjustment
of six months. Parameter Â is set to 1.
4.2 U.S. Monetary Shocks
In this section we study the international transmission of a U.S. monetary
shock in the case where all export prices are set in dollars (s = 0). Consider
the Dornbusch exercise of an unanticipated permanent rise in the relative
U.S. money supply. Figure 1 shows the dynamic responses of key macro-
economic variables to 1 percent rise in the U.S. money supply. In all Fig-
ures, the vertical axes show percentage deviations from the initial steady
state. Because bond holdings are normalized by initial consumption, the
bond holdings of U.S. households show deviation as a percentage of initial
consumption level.
Figure 1 demonstrates that a U.S. monetary shock generates not only a
positive comovement of output across regions, but also a positive comove-
ment of consumption across regions. This is in contrast to virtually all
NOEM models, but consistent with Schmidt (2005). Betts and Devereux
(2000, 2001) show that, in the LCP case, monetary shocks tend to generate
large negative comovements of consumption across countries, but high posi-
tive comovements of output across countries. In the PCP case, the opposite
holds true.
Panel (c) in Figure 1 displays that the nominal exchange rate overshoots
its new steady state equilibrium level. In the new steady state, the depreci-
ation of the dollar is less than the relative increase in the money supply, as
in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995). As we explain below, a U.S. monetary shock
generates a short-run current account surplus which entails a permanent rise
in relative U.S. consumption. This mitigates the depreciation of the dollar.
In the DP case, as in the LCP case (Betts and Devereux 2000), the exchange
rate overshoots if the consumption elasticity of money demand is less than
one. Panel (d) demonstrates that the nominal depreciation translates into
a real depreciation.
As emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995, 645), a monetary shock
temporarily lowers the real interest rate and thus raises global consumption
demand. In addition, the liquidity e¤ect of a monetary shock lowers nominal
interest rates in both regions. Since uncovered interest rate parity is assumed
to hold, exchange rate overshooting creates an interest-rate di¤erential that
equals the rate of appreciation.
The rise in global demand has di¤erent e¤ects on U.S. and European
output, because of exchange rate changes. In the DP case, exchange rate
pass-through is asymmetric: it is zero in the U.S. and one in Europe. In Eu-
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rope, with sticky prices, the depreciation of the dollar implies that European
goods become more expensive relative to U.S. goods thus households sub-
stitute consumption towards U.S. goods away from European goods. This
expenditure-switching e¤ect causes an increase in U.S. income and thus a
rise in relative U.S. consumption. As panel (e) shows, to smooth consump-
tion, U.S. households save part of this income by running a current account
surplus. Households, however, do not have ‡at consumption pro…les because
real interest rates di¤er from the steady state value.8
In the U.S., when prices are sticky, the relative price of U.S. to European
goods is left una¤ected. The impact of a monetary shock on the output of
both regions is in‡uenced by the direct demand increase from U.S. house-
holds. This direct demand increase is (almost) identical for both U.S. and
European goods. Because European exports increase substantially, Euro-
pean production increases. The depreciation of the dollar does not switch
U.S. demand, but it a¤ects the earnings of European …rms. When Eu-
ropean …rms price their exports in dollars, the depreciation of the dollar
reduces their earnings measured in euro terms. This reduces European con-
sumption. Some but not all prices are sticky. U.S. …rms experience higher
marginal costs, due to higher labour demand. Therefore, the U.S. terms of
trade improves and U.S. goods become more expensive relative to European
goods and some U.S. demand is shifted towards European goods.
As mentioned, a U.S. monetary shock rises European consumption in
the short run. A drop in earnings due to the depreciation of the dollar,
at given production level, tends to lower European consumption. These
e¤ects, however, are o¤set by positive e¤ects. European exports increase
substantially leading to an increase in income. Moreover, the depreciation
of the dollar induces a fall in the European CPI allowing for an increase in
consumption.
Panel (f) shows that a U.S. monetary shock induces a permanent im-
provement in the U.S. terms of trade. U.S. households, with higher long-run
wealth, choose to work less (the opposite happens in Europe). A fall in the
supply of U.S. goods raises the relative price of U.S. goods.
4.3 European Monetary Shocks
We now turn study to the macroeconomic e¤ects of a European monetary
shock and consider the same unanticipated permanent rise in the money
supply. Figure 2 shows the macroeconomic e¤ects of U.S. and European
monetary shocks on output and consumption. Only the e¤ects on output
and consumption are shown due to the fact that the responses of other
8 If the European money supply had been reduced by one percent (at the same time
when the U.S. money supply is increased by one percent), households would have main-
tained a ‡at consumption pro…le. Sutherland (1996) considers such an exercise and demon-
strates that, in this case, households have a ‡at consumption pro…le.
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variables are a mirror image of a U.S. shock. The solid lines show the e¤ects
of a U.S. monetary shock and the dashes lines show the e¤ects of a European
monetary shock. "Domestic output" refers to U.S. (European) output in the
case of a U.S. (European) shock.
Figure 2 reveals two noteworthy results. First, while a U.S. monetary
expansion increases European output and consumption, a European mone-
tary expansion reduces U.S. output and output. So U.S. monetary shocks
generate positive comovements of output across regions. On the other hand,
European shocks generate negative comovements. Second, a U.S. monetary
expansion increases U.S. output and consumption more than a European
expansion increases European output and consumption.
The di¤erences in the international transmission of U.S. and European
monetary shocks stem from asymmetric exchange rate pass-through. A Eu-
ropean monetary shock, like a U.S. shock, causes an exchange rate depreci-
ation. In the case of a U.S. shock, the direct demand increase coming from
U.S. ("domestic") households increases demand for both U.S. ("domestic")
and European ("foreign") goods due to the fact that a dollar depreciation
does not a¤ect the price of import in the U.S. In the case of a European
shock, however, the depreciation of the euro raises the price of imports in
Europe and European goods become cheaper relative to U.S. goods. The
expenditure switching e¤ect raises European ("domestic") output and con-
sumption, but reduces U.S. ("foreign") output and consumption. Therefore,
European shocks, unlike U.S. shocks, generate negative comovements of out-
put across regions.
A European shock raises European output less than a U.S. shock raises
U.S. output while the preceding analysis suggests the opposite. The intuition
behind this result is as follows. As mentioned, in the case of a U.S. shock,
the depreciation of the dollar implies the expenditure-switching e¤ect in
Europe. This causes an increase in U.S. output and consumption. On the
other hand, in the case of a European shock, due to DP, the depreciation
of the euro does not a¤ect the price of imports in the U.S. and there is no
expenditure switching e¤ect in the U.S. Asymmetric expenditure switching
e¤ects explain the asymmetric transmission of U.S. and European monetary
shocks.
5 The Emergence of the Euro and International
Monetary Policy Transmission
5.1 U.S. Monetary Shocks
For the reasons discussed in Section 2, our conjecture is that the emergence
of the euro as an international currency implies that more European …rm
invoice their exports in euros. As also mentioned, for simplicity, we suppose
16
that the emergence of the euro implies a transition to a situation where
all export prices are set in the producer’s currency. Figure 3 shows the
macroeconomic e¤ects of a U.S. monetary shock in two cases. The solid
lines depict the e¤ects of a monetary shock in the DP case while the dashed
lines depict the PCP case. In the PCP case, the model is rather identical to
the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model.
As can be seen from Figure 3, the stimulate e¤ects of a monetary shock
on U.S. output are reinforced. Moreover, the emergence of the euro induces
some interesting qualitative changes. First, a U.S. monetary shock causes a
deterioration of the U.S. terms of trade in the short run. Second, the positive
impact of a U.S. monetary shock on European output reverses to negative.
The intuition behind these changes is apparent: complete exchange rate
pass-through.
The U.S. terms-of-trade deterioration is consistent with the conventional
presumption that unexpected currency depreciations are associated with
deteriorations rather than improvements of the terms of trade [see Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (2000)]. Thus, in the PCP case, the depreciation of the dollar
raises the relative prices of imports, shifting U.S. demand towards U.S. goods
away from European goods. This expenditure switching e¤ect increases U.S.
output, compared to the DP case. U.S. goods become cheaper relative to
European goods also in Europe. Because global, not only European, demand
shifts towards U.S. goods, European output decreases. The emergence of the
euro, therefore, may reduce the cross country correlations in output. This
result is consistent with Betts and Devereux (2000, 2001): the presence of
LCP raises the cross country correlations in output.
The emergence of the euro, however, may raise the cross country corre-
lations in consumption. Panel (c) demonstrates that the transition to PCP
changes European consumption surprisingly little, notwithstanding the drop
in production. The change in the European CPI (DP compared with PCP)
is very low. In the PCP case, the improvement of the European terms of
trade and the fact the depreciation of the dollar does not reduce the earn-
ings of European …rms, at given production level, allow for an increase in
European consumption. The fall in income due to the drop in production
almost o¤sets the positive e¤ects, leaving European consumption almost un-
changed. The emergence of the euro mitigates the positive impact of a U.S.
monetary shock on U.S. consumption. With a greater exchange rate pass-
through, the U.S. CPI tends to rise more, inducing a fall in consumption.
This and the terms of trade e¤ect dominate leading to a fall in consumption,
relative to the DP case, notwithstanding higher production.
Figure 3 illustrates some expected results. First, under PCP, the nominal
exchange rate jumps immediately to the steady state level. Second, because
preferences are identical across regions and the LOOP holds for all goods, the
CPI-based real exchange rate is always constant. These results -of course
-are the same as in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995). The results are based on
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costless and free trade, so the LOOP always holds. The degree of exchange
rate pass-through is never 1 and instant in practice. For example, deviations
for the LOOP can arise from the non-traded component incorporated in the
consumer price of the traded good. Local distribution costs such as rents,
advertising etc. are likely to cause deviations the LOOP (McCallum and
Nelson (2000) and Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003)). In any case, we can
conclude that the emergence of the euro is likely to reduce the variability of
exchange rates that monetary shocks cause.
Finally, panel (g) of Figure 3 shows that the emergence of the euro may
reinforce the e¤ect of monetary shocks on the current account. This result is
concordant with Betts and Devereux (2000), they show that LCP diminishes
the e¤ect on the current account. In the PCP case, ex post real interest rates
are equalized across regions, thus the lower U.S. real interest rate encourages
European households to borrow more.
5.2 European Monetary Shocks
This section studies how the emergence of the euro may a¤ect the inter-
national transmission of European monetary shocks. In the PCP case, the
e¤ects of a European monetary shock are exactly the same as those of a
U.S. shock. The only asymmetry arises from the international capital mar-
ket, due to fact that nominal bonds are denominated in the dollar. Free
trade in nominal bonds and PPP, however, imply that real interest rates
cannot diverge across regions.
It turns out from Figure 4 that the emergence of the euro reinforces
the positive e¤ect of a monetary shock on European output. Second, the
negative e¤ect of a European monetary shock on U.S. output is reinforced.
Third, the emergence of the euro might be good news for U.S. consumers,
the negative e¤ect of a European monetary shock on consumption reverses
to positive. As in the case of a U.S. shock, the fact that exchange rate
pass-through becomes complete in the U.S. explains these changes.
The transition to PCP implies that exchange rate movements induce an
expenditure switching e¤ects also in the U.S. With nominal prices sticky in
the short run, the euro’s depreciation switches U.S. demand towards Euro-
pean products away from U.S. products. Under DP, the euro’s depreciation
switches only European demand towards European products. Under PCP,
both U.S. and European households have an incentive to shift to relative
less expensive European goods from U.S. goods. Thus world demand shifts
towards European products, leading to an increase (fall) in European (U.S.)
output and consumption, relative to the DP case. Finally, complete ex-
change rate pass-through implies that the dollar’s appreciation induces a
fall in the U.S. CPI. Hence allowing for an increase in U.S. consumption.
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6 Conclusions
Monetary policies in the United States and Europe have an important in-
‡uence on the rest of the world, because of the size of the economies. This
paper develops a model for analyzing the international transmission of U.S.
and European monetary shocks in the case where all export prices are set
in U.S. dollars. We show that asymmetric exchange rate pass-through im-
plies that the international e¤ects of U.S. monetary shocks are di¤erent from
those of European shocks. For example, U.S. shocks generate positive co-
movements of output across regions. On the other hand, European shocks
generate negative comovements.
After 50 years of the dollar’s hegemony in the world economy, the single
European currency was brought into play. The introduction of the euro was
a fundamental change and the euro may become an international currency.
In this paper we attempt to shed light on the question of how the increase in
the use of the euro in international trade will a¤ect the international trans-
mission of European and U.S. monetary shocks. It is shown that if the role
of the euro in international trade increases, this has signi…cant implications
for the international transmission of monetary shocks. More generally, the
emergence of the euro as an international currency has signi…cant implica-
tions for optimal monetary policy and the conduct of monetary policy.
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Figure 1: Macroeconomic e¤ects of a U.S. monetary shock under dollar
pricing
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic e¤ects of European and U.S monetary shocks
under dollar pricing
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
(b) Domestic consumption
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
(a) Domestic output
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
(d) Foreign consumption
0 2 4 6 8 10
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
(c) Foreign output
U.S. shock
European shock
U.S. shock
European shock
U.S. shock
European shock
U.S. shock
European shock
24
Figure 3: Macroeconomic e¤ects of a U.S. monetary shock -dollar pricing
versus producer currency pricing
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Figure 4: Macroeconomic e¤ects of a European monetary shock -dollar
pricing versus producer currency pricing
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